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Dispersion in House Price and 
Income Growth across Markets
Facts and Theories
Joseph Gyourko, Christopher Mayer, and Todd Sinai
2.1    Introduction
One of the most striking patterns in the American socioeconomic land-
scape since World War II involves the skewness of long-  run house price 
growth. Real house prices in metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) such as 
San Francisco, Boston, and New York have appreciated at rates well above 
the national average over the postwar period. Indeed, this time period has 
witnessed two very diﬀerent patterns of urban success: one pairs strong popu-
lation expansion with mild house price appreciation, but the other involves 
very high house price growth with relatively little population growth.
This latter phenomenon is especially intriguing, because high house price 
growth in an MSA implies that new residents have to pay ever-  increasing 
amounts to live there, especially relative to the MSAs with greater popu-
lation growth. Of course, basic price theory tells us that consistently high 
prices require some limits on new supply. After all, if land were plentiful and 
homebuilders could supply new units whenever prices rose suﬃciently above 
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production costs to provide them a competitive return, prices would never 
exceed construction cost in the long run. Others have studied supply side 
constraints, and there is no doubt that many localities have become expert 
at imposing a myriad of hurdles that raise the cost of developing new hous-
ing (Glaeser and Gyourko 2003; Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saks 2005a, 2005b; 
Gyourko, Saiz, and Summers 2008; Saks 2008).
While inelastic supply is necessary for above- average long- run house price 
growth, it is not suﬃcient. Some factor must drive demand for living in the 
high price growth MSAs so that households are willing to pay an increasing 
house price premium to live there. In this chapter, we consider four potential 
explanations that stem from recent urban research. One possibility is that 
the value of agglomeration is rising in some inelastically supplied cities. 
Another is that these cities simply have become more productive but not due 
to agglomeration. A third possibility is that the level of amenities in these 
cities has grown. And the fourth explanation is that the dispersion in house 
price growth arises from an increasing number of high- income families at the 
national level, combined with households sorting across metropolitan areas. 
In this case, the rich households ultimately outbid others for the scarce slots 
available in supply-  constrained metropolitan areas. We will conclude that 
the evidence suggests that this sorting mechanism is at least partially respon-
sible for the urban outcomes we see, but it also is clear that much more work 
is needed to pin down the relative contributions of these basic factors.
We begin in the next section by describing some basic facts about the 
long- run evolution of house prices over time by MSA.1 There is considerable 
heterogeneity in long- run house price growth across MSAs, and those cross-
 MSA  diﬀerences persist. We show that many MSAs that experienced high 
house price growth had little population growth and vice versa. Following 
Gyourko, Mayer, and Sinai (2006), we classify a subset of MSAs with high 
house price growth and low population growth as “superstar cities.” These 
cities experienced growing demand that was capitalized into land prices 
rather than manifested as new construction.
In section 2.3, we use a spatial equilibrium structure developed by Glaeser 
and Tobio (2008) to decompose the patterns of income, population, and 
housing unit growth to shed light on how superstar cities diﬀer from other 
cities in regard to growth in their amenities, productivity, and housing 
supply. This framework implies that superstar cities have much lower hous-
ing supply growth than other cities. It also shows little diﬀerence between 
superstars and other cities in the growth rate of amenities or productivity.
The spatial distribution of income growth is brought to bear in section 
2.4 as another set of stylized facts that needs explaining. Not only do long-
  run income growth rates vary widely across MSAs, but those MSAs with 
1. Because we use decennial census data, our empirical analysis stops before the recent hous-
ing market bust. While this cycle is very interesting for a variety of reasons, our story and anal-
ysis are much more about trends that are not dependent on short-  run dynamics.Dispersion in House Price and Income Growth across Markets    6 9
growing house prices experience more rapidly growing average incomes, as 
well as a right shift in the entire income distribution. This fact is not true 
for any high-  demand MSA, only those where it is diﬃcult to construct new 
housing.
In sections 2.5 and 2.6, we discuss how the various possible explanations 
for urban growth—growing amenities, greater productivity, agglomeration 
beneﬁ  ts, or growth in the right tail of the national income distribution—
comport with the stylized facts we established earlier. Section 2.7 brieﬂ  y 
concludes.
2.2      Stylized Facts on the Growing Dispersion in House Prices
2.2.1    House  Price  Growth
We use and discuss a variety of data from the U.S. decennial censuses, 
aggregated to the level of the metropolitan area, which corresponds to the 
local labor market. We use a sample of 280 such areas that had populations 
of at least 50,000 in 1950 and that are in the continental United States.2 
Information on the distribution of house values, family incomes, popula-
tion, and the number of housing units were collected.
Since the deﬁ  nitions of metro areas change over time, we use one based 
on 1999 county boundaries to project consistent metro-  area boundaries 
forward and backward through time.3 Data were collected at the county 
level and aggregated to the metropolitan statistical area, or to the primary 
metropolitan statistical area (PMSA) level in the case of consolidated metro-
politan statistical areas. Data for the 1970 to 2000 period are obtained from 
GeoLytics, which compiles long-  form data from the Decennial Censuses 
of Housing and Population. We hand collected 1950 and 1960 data from 
2. Thirty-  six areas with populations under 50,000 in 1950 were excluded from our analysis 
because of concerns about abnormal house quality changes in markets with so few units at 
the start of our period of analysis. Those MSAs are: Auburn-  Opelika, Barnstable, Bismarck, 
Boulder, Brazoria, Bryan, Casper, Cheyenne, Columbia, Corvallis, Dover, Flagstaﬀ, Fort Col-
lins, Fort Myers, Fort Pierce, Fort Walton Beach, Grand Junction, Iowa City, Jacksonville, Las 
Cruces, Lawrence, Melbourne, Missoula, Naples, Ocala, Olympia, Panama City, Pocatello, 
Punta Gorda, Rapid City, Redding, Rochester, Santa Fe, Victoria, Yolo, and Yuma. That said, 
none of our key results are materially aﬀected by this paring of the sample. Similar concerns 
account for our not using data from the ﬁ  rst Census of Housing in 1940 in the regression results 
reported in the following text. (All individual housing trait data from the 1940 Census were 
lost, so we cannot track any trait changes over time from that year.) However, we did repeat 
our MSA-  level analysis over the 1940 to 2000 time period. While the point estimates naturally 
diﬀer from those previously reported, the magnitudes, signs, and statistical signiﬁ  cance are 
essentially unchanged. Finally, the New York PMSA is missing crucial house price data for 
1960 and is excluded from the analysis reported in the following text. The Census did not report 
house value data for that year, because it did not believe it could accurately assess value for 
cooperative units, the preponderant unit type in Manhattan at that time.
3. We use deﬁ  nitions provided by the Oﬃce of Management and Budget (OMB), available at: 
http:/ / www.census.gov/ population/ estimates/ metro- city/ 90mﬁ  ps.txt. One qualiﬁ  cation is that 
in the case of New England county metropolitan areas, the entire county was included if any 
part of it was assigned by the OMB.70        Joseph Gyourko, Christopher Mayer, and Todd Sinai
hard- copy volumes of the Census of Population and Housing. Both sources 
are based on 100 percent population counts. All dollar values are converted 
into constant 2000 dollars.4
In each data set, we divide the distribution of real family incomes into 
ﬁ  ve categories that are consistent over time. The income categories in the 
original census data change in each decade. We set the category boundar-
ies equal to 25, 50, 75, and 100 percent of the 1980 family income topcode 
and populate the resulting ﬁ  ve bins using a weighted average of the actual 
categories in 2000 dollars, assuming a uniform distribution of families 
within the bins. Since 1980 had among the lowest topcode in real terms, 
using it as an upper bound reduces miscategorization of families into income 
bins. We call a family poor if its income is less than $39,179 in 2000 dollars. 
Middle poor are those families with incomes between $39,179 and $78,358; 
middle-  income families have incomes between $78,359 and $117,537; 
and middle-  rich families lie between $117,538 and $156,716. Finally, rich 
families have incomes in excess of the 1980 real topcode of $156,716.
Using these data, we begin by detailing the remarkable dispersion—and 
even skewness—across MSAs in house price growth over the 1950 to 2000 
period. Figure 2.1 plots the kernel density of average annual real house price 
growth between 1950 and 2000 for our sample of 280 metropolitan areas. 
The tail of growth rates above 2.6 percent is especially thick, and the distri-
bution is right skewed. Table 2.1, which lists the average real annual house 
price growth rate between 1950 and 2000 for the ten fastest and ten slowest 
appreciating metropolitan areas out of the ﬁ  fty MSAs with populations of 
at least 500,000 in 1950, documents that the dispersion seen in this ﬁ  gure is 
not an artifact of a few areas that were small initially and then experienced 
abnormally rapid price growth.5
These annual diﬀerences in house price growth rates compound to very 
large price gaps over time, even within the top few markets. For example, 
San Francisco’s 3.5 percent annual house price appreciation implies a 458 
percent increase in real house prices between 1950 and 2000, more than twice 
as large as seventh-  ranked Boston at 212 percent, which itself still grew 50 
percent more than the sample average of 132 percent for the ﬁ  fty most popu-
lous metropolitan areas.6 Figure 2.2, which plots a kernel density estimate 
of the 280 metropolitan areas average house values in 1950 and 2000, shows 
4. We also use some data for 1940. Population and housing unit data for that year are based 
on 100 percent counts, but housing values are averages from the 1940 sample provided by the 
Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) housed at the University of Minnesota. We 
do not yet use any family income data for 1940.
5. A complete list of house price appreciation rates by metropolitan area, along with 1950 
and 2000 mean housing prices, is reported in the appendix table 2A.1.
6. It is worth emphasizing that the extremely high appreciation seen in the Bay Area, south-
ern California, and Seattle markets is not restricted to the past couple of decades. The top 
ﬁ  ve markets in terms of annual real appreciation rates between 1950 and 1980 are as follows: 
(a) San Francisco, 3.65 percent; (b) San Diego, 3.49 percent; (c) Los Angeles, 3.20 percent; 
(d) Oakland, 2.99 percent; and (e) Seattle, 2.88 percent.Dispersion in House Price and Income Growth across Markets    7 1
that skewness has increased over the last ﬁ  fty years, with a relative handful 
of markets ending up commanding enormous price premiums. Figure 2.3 
normalizes the means and standard deviations of the 1950 and 2000 house 
value distributions so that they are equal and then plots them against each 
other. In 2000, the right tail of the MSA house value distribution extends 
to four times the mean, more than twice the highest MSA from the right tail 
of the 1950 Census. The left tail ends at about half the mean in both years, 
although it is slightly more skewed in the 2000 Census.
There also is long-  run persistence in the markets that exhibit above-
  average price growth. Across the two thirty year periods from 1940 to 1970 
Fig. 2.1    Density of 1950–  2000 annualized real house price growth rates across 
MSAs with 1950 population > 50,000
Table 2.1  Real annualized house price growth, 1950 to 2000, top and bottom ten 
MSAs with 1950 population > 500,000
 
Top 10 MSAs by price growth
Annualized growth rate, 1950–2000 
Bottom 10 MSAs by price growth
Annualized growth rate, 1950–2000 
San Francisco 3.53 San Antonio 1.13
Oakland 2.82 Milwaukee 1.06
Seattle 2.74 Pittsburgh 1.02
San Diego 2.61 Dayton 0.99
Los Angeles 2.46 Albany (NY) 0.97
Portland (OR) 2.36 Cleveland 0.91
Boston 2.30 Rochester (NY) 0.89
Bergen- Passaic  (NJ) 2.19 Youngstown- Warren 0.81
Charlotte 2.18 Syracuse 0.67
  New Haven   2.12  Buﬀalo   0.54 
Note: Population-  weighted average of the ﬁ  fty MSAs in this sample: 1.70.72        Joseph Gyourko, Christopher Mayer, and Todd Sinai
and 1970 to 2000, average annual percentage house price growth has a posi-
tive correlation of about 0.3. The root of this latter result can be seen in table 
2.2, which reports the transition matrix for MSAs ranked by their average 
real house price growth rates computed over the two thirty year periods of 
1940 to 1970 and 1970 to 2000. Most high-  appreciation areas do not move 
very far in their relative price growth ranking. For example, of the thirty-
  two MSAs in the top quartile of annual house price growth between 1940 
and 1970, half were still in the top quartile, and nearly two-  thirds remained 
ranked in the top half between 1970 and 2000. Outside of the top growth 
rate areas, there is more movement across the distribution.7
Fig. 2.2    Density of mean house values across MSAs, 1950 versus 2000
Fig. 2.3    Skewness in mean house values across MSAs, 1950 versus 2000
7. Over shorter horizons such as a decade, MSAs can experience large price swings. In fact, 
the correlation in house price appreciation rates across decades is often negative.Dispersion in House Price and Income Growth across Markets    7 3
2.2.2      House Price and Housing Unit Growth
Typically, the markets with high long-  run house price growth have not 
experienced much growth in the number of housing units, although that rela-
tionship has evolved over time, as housing supply has presumably become 
more inelastic in some cities. In table 2.3, we document the relationship 
between housing price and housing unit growth over time for the high price 
appreciation markets. To estimate this relationship, we regress the decadal 
growth in the number of housing units at the MSA level on the long-  run 
growth in house price, allowing a diﬀerent intercept and slope for those 
areas in the top quartile of the price appreciation distribution. Speciﬁ  cally, 
we estimate:
(1) % Hi,t        ∗% Pi    ∗(TopQuartilei)   
   ∗(% Pi ∗ TopQuartile)   εi,t,
where % Hi,t is the percentage change in housing units in metropolitan area 
i during decade t, % Pi is the percentage house  price growth in metropolitan 
area i between 1960 and 2000, and TopQuartile is a dummy indicator for 
whether the metropolitan area is among the top quartile of areas in terms 
of house price appreciation over the 1960 to 2000 period.
These results show that the price growth/  unit growth relationship for the 
top quartile of the price appreciation distribution has essentially disap-
peared between the 1960s and the 1990s. For the bottom 75 percent of the 
price growth distribution, the relationship between average price growth and 
unit growth is positive, and with the exception of the 1980s, it is ﬂ  at over 
the decades. The MSAs in the top quartile in terms of price appreciation 
start out in 1970 with a slightly less positive correlation than for the lower 
75 percent (11.12 –  3.12   8.0 correlation). By the 1970s, however, the high-
est price growth markets are already in negative territory (17.18 –   18.14   
– 0.96), while there still is a large positive relationship between long- run price 
growth and housing unit production for the other metropolitan areas. The 
negative correlation for the top quartile increases over time, to –  3.62 in the 
1980s and –  3.89 in the 1990s.
Table 2.2  Thirty-  year house price appreciation rate transition matrix
1970 to 2000
1940 to 1970   Top quartile   Second   Third   Fourth
Top quartile 16 6 6 4
Second 8 8 7 9
Third 4 7 7 14
Fourth   4   11   12   6
Note: The underlying sample for this table includes only 129 metropolitan areas due to limita-
tions on data available back to 1940.74        Joseph Gyourko, Christopher Mayer, and Todd Sinai
2.2.3    Classifying  “Superstar  Cities”
We now turn to other work we have done (Gyourko, Mayer, and Sinai 
2006) to identify those markets with high house price growth and low 
housing unit growth. Such markets are termed “superstar” markets in that 
research, and they are markets that are in high demand and those in which 
something prevents the development of many new homes.8 Thus, house price 
growth is very high, but housing unit growth is not.
Because we do not observe the true state of demand and the literature does 
not provide high quality estimates of the elasticity of supply, the following 
two measures are combined to determine whether a market is a superstar. 
First, a market is classiﬁ  ed as in high demand if the sum of its housing unit 
and housing price growth is above the sample median for the relevant period 
of analysis. Second, a metropolitan area is deﬁ  ned to have a low elasticity 
of supply if its ratio of housing price growth to housing unit growth is at or 
above the ninetieth percentile of the distribution for all metropolitan areas 
over the relevant period of analysis.
Each of these measures is constructed using data from the two decades 
prior to the year for which a superstar designation is made. Thus, the status 
of each metropolitan area is classiﬁ  ed from 1970 to 2000, with 1970 being 
the ﬁ  rst year, because the underlying data begin in 1950.9 Figure 2.4 docu-
ments the outcome of this methodology for the most recent period—using 
1980 to 2000 data to determine superstar status in 2000. Average real annual 
Table 2.3  The relationship between high long-  run price growth MSAs and the 
change in the number of housing units, by decade
    1960s   1970s   1980s   1990s
Average house price growth, 1960–2000 11.12 17.18 11.73 9.37
(4.76) (3.77) (2.19) (1.51)
In top quartile of average price growth 6.10 35.23 31.99 24.99
(16.02) (12.68) (7.38) (5.08)
Average price growth   in top quartile –3.12 –18.14 –15.35 –13.26
(7.91) (6.26) (3.64) (2.51)
Adjusted R2   0.04   0.10   0.16   0.15
Notes: The left-  hand-  side variable is the decadal percent change in the number of housing 
units. Standard errors in parentheses. To be in the top quartile, average real house price growth 
must have exceeded 1.75 percent over the 1960 to 2000 period.
8. That something could be a natural constraint such as an ocean or a man-  made constraint 
in the form of binding growth controls on housing development.
9. Because the empirical task here is to document whether equilibrium relationships implied 
by our model exist in the data rather than to identify causal mechanisms for why a place be-
comes a superstar, the use of lagged data is not driven by endogeneity concerns (which these 
lags would not deal with eﬀectively in any event). Rather, we wish to be able to classify superstar 
status in the most recent census data from the year 2000, and we suspect that any relation-
ship between income segregation and house price eﬀects occur after the superstar market has 
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house price growth between 1980 and 2000 is on the y-  axis, with housing 
unit growth over the same two decades on the x- axis. The single downward-
  sloping line reﬂ  ects the boundary between markets with a sum of price and 
unit growth above the sample median across all our MSAs for 1980 to 2000. 
Any metro area lying below that line is a relatively low-  demand place by 
deﬁ  nition. The left-  most and steepest positively sloped line from the origin 
captures the elasticity of supply at the ninetieth percentile of the distribution 
of the ratio of price growth to unit growth. For this twenty- year period, the 
MSA at the ninetieth percentile has a ratio of real annual house price growth 
to unit growth above 1.7. The right-  most and ﬂ  attest positively sloped line 
from the origin reﬂ  ects the inverse of the ninetieth percentile ratio value 
(i.e., 1/  1.7, or 0.59).
Cities in the region marked A, which is both above the boundary deter-
mining low-  demand status and above the boundary marking signiﬁ  cant 
inelasticity of supply, are composed of many coastal markets including 
San Francisco, New York, and Boston that have experienced very strong 
house price appreciation (indicating high latent demand) but little supply 
response in terms of new construction over the past two decades. The other 
markets in relatively high-  demand areas are divided into two groups for 
the purposes of the following empirical analysis. What we term “nonsuper-
stars” are the metropolitan areas in the C range, which include markets with 
relatively high housing unit production and relatively low housing price 
growth. These high- demand markets, which include Las Vegas and Phoenix, 
build suﬃcient new housing to satisfy demand so that real price growth is 
low. The remaining high- demand markets are in between the superstars and 
nonsuperstars and lay in the B range in ﬁ  gure 2.4. They have experienced 
relatively high demand and have both built at least a modest amount of new 
units and experienced a moderate amount of real house price appreciation. 
The ﬁ  nal set of metropolitan areas are in low demand and lay in the region 
below the negatively sloped line in ﬁ  gure 2.4.
This nonlinear categorization is useful, because it allows us to observe 
how MSAs evolve over time. It seems natural that metropolitan areas could 
become more inelastically supplied as they grow and begin to ﬁ  ll up in the 
face of geographic constraints or politically imposed restrictions on devel-
opment. This would appear as a market moving over time from area C to B 
to A in ﬁ  gure 2.4. We do observe such an evolution over time. In 1980, only 
San Francisco and Los Angeles clearly qualiﬁ  ed as superstars, with the other 
markets ﬁ  lling up over time.
2.3      Characteristics of Superstar Market Growth: Decomposing 
the Roles of Productivity, Amenities, and Housing Supply
As a ﬁ  rst pass in understanding what determines the unique price growth 
of superstar markets, we apply a strategy developed by Glaeser and Tobio Dispersion in House Price and Income Growth across Markets    7 7
(2008). Their approach uses structure imposed by a Rosen/ Roback- style the-
ory to transform MSA diﬀerences in house price growth, population growth, 
and income growth into implied diﬀerences in the growth of MSA-  speciﬁ  c 
amenities, productivity, and housing supply. We use this decomposition to 
see how superstars vary from other cities on these dimensions.
Following Glaeser and Tobio (2008), every market in the United States is 
characterized by a location-  speciﬁ  c productivity level of A and ﬁ  rm output 
of AN K Z1–   –   , where N represents the number of workers, K is traded 
capital, and Z is nontraded capital. Traded capital always can be purchased 
for a price of 1. The location has a ﬁ  xed supply of nontraded capital equal 
to Z .
Three equilibrium conditions can be derived involving households, ﬁ  rms, 
and the housing market. One involves consumers who are presumed to 
have Cobb-  Douglas utility deﬁ  ned over tradable goods and housing, the 
nontraded good. The next equations assume the following utility func-
tion deﬁ  ned over traded goods (C), housing (H), and city amenities ( ): 
 C1–   H . Standard optimizing behavior assumptions yield indirect utility 
of   (1 –    )1–    WpH
–   . Spatial equilibrium requires household utility to be 
the same everywhere, with the level determined by the utility available (de-
noted U  ) in the reservation market, which always is open to any household 
or ﬁ  rm.
The second equilibrium condition involves ﬁ  rms, which are presumed to 
behave competitively, so they cannot earn excess proﬁ  ts in any one market in 
equilibrium. Hence, their labor demand function is derived from the ﬁ  rm’s 
ﬁ  rst-  order conditions, as usual.10
An important innovation of Glaeser and Tobio (2008) that is quite rele-
vant for this chapter is its introduction of housing supply heterogeneity 
into the classic urban spatial equilibrium framework. Speciﬁ  cally, housing 
is produced competitively with height (h) and land (L) so that the total 
quantity of housing supplied equals hL. There is a ﬁ  xed quantity of land in 
the market area, denoted L , which will determine an endogenous price for 
land ( pL) and housing ( pH). The cost of producing hL units of structure on 
L units of land is presumed to be c0h L. Given these assumptions, the devel-
oper’s proﬁ  t for producing these hL units of housing is pHhL –   c0h L –   pLL, 
where     1. Of course, this must equal zero, given that we have presumed 
free entry of developers. The ﬁ  rst-  order condition for height then implies 
the area’s housing supply.
The ﬁ  rm’s labor demand equation, the equality between indirect util-
10. As in Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982), the spatial equilibrium assumption does not 
mean that wages corrected for local price (real wages) are equal across space but that higher 
real wages in some places are oﬀsetting lower amenity levels. However, spatial equilibrium is 
presumed to hold at every point in time, which does imply that housing prices are suﬃciently 
ﬂ  exible to oﬀset diﬀerences in wages and amenities, not that labor or capital has perfectly 
adjusted at all times and places.78        Joseph Gyourko, Christopher Mayer, and Todd Sinai
ity in the town and reservation utility, and the housing price equation are 
three equations with the three unknowns of population, income, and hous-
ing prices. Solving these equations for the unknowns yields equations (2) 
through (4) from Glaeser and Tobio (2008):
(2) Log(N)   KN   
(          )Log(A)   (1    )[ Log( )    (    1)Log(L )]
       
 (1        )     (    1)
,
(3)   Log(W)   KW   
(    1) Log(A)   (1        )[ Log( )    (    1)Log(L )]
       
 (1        )     (    1)
,
and
(4) Log(pH)   Kp   
(    1)[Log(A)    Log( )   (1        )Log(L )]
      
 (1        )     (    1)
,
where KN, KW, and KP are constant terms that diﬀer across cities but not 
over time within a city, and all other terms are as deﬁ  ned previously.
These static relations are transformed into dynamic ones by presuming 
that changes to productivity, amenities, and housing supply are character-
ized by the following growth equations:
(5) Log  
At 1  
At    KA    AS    A,
(6) Log  
 t 1  
 t    K      S     , 
and
(7) Log  
L t 1  
L t    KL    LS    L,
where S is a dummy variable reﬂ  ecting superstar market status as deﬁ  ned 
previously, the terms KA, K , and KL are constants, the terms  A,   , and  L 
are the expected diﬀerence in growth rates for superstar markets, and  A, 
  , and  L are standard error terms. Given this, equations (2) through (4) 
imply the following:
(8) Log
Nt 1  
Nt    K N 
      1{(          ) A   (1    )[       (    1) L]}S    N,
(9) Log
Wt 1  
Wt    K W 
      1{(    1)  A   (1        )[       (    1) L]}S    W, 
andDispersion in House Price and Income Growth across Markets    7 9
(10) Log
Pt 1  
Pt    K P     1(    1)[ A         (1        ) L]S    P,
where     [ (1 –     –    )     (  –   1)].11
Equations (8) through (10) enable us to transform diﬀerential changes 
in population, incomes, and house prices across superstar and other cities 
into diﬀerences in innovations in productivity, amenities, and housing 
supply over time. Each of the equations can be estimated using ordinary 
least squares (OLS) by regressing each of log population, income, or house 
price growth on a constant and a superstar indicator variable, recover-
ing the estimated coeﬃcients on the superstar dummy, which are Bpop, Binc, 
and Bval, respectively. Then, some algebra yields that the connection be-
tween superstar status and productivity growth ( A) equals (1 –    –   )Bpop   
(1 –    )Binc, where Bpop and Binc are the estimated coeﬃcients on a superstar 
market dummy variable from the population and wage change regressions, 
respectively. The weight on the population regression coeﬃcient is the share 
of production associated with immobile capital. The weight on the income 
regression coeﬃcient is the share of production associated with labor plus 
immobile inputs.12
The connection between superstar status and changing amenities is given 
by   , which equals  Bval –   Binc, where   is the share of expenditure going 
toward housing, and Bval is the coeﬃcient from the house price change 
regression. Given that traded goods always cost 1 and that housing is the 
only nontraded good, this diﬀerence reﬂ  ects the change in real wages. If 
real wages are decreasing, then amenities are rising, so the basic insight of 
the static Rosen/  Roback compensating diﬀerential model also holds in this 
more dynamic context.13
The connection between housing supply growth and superstar status,  L, 
equals Bpop   Binc –   [ / (1  –    )]Bval, where   reﬂ  ects the elasticity of housing 
supply. In this equation, population directly aﬀects housing supply one for 
one, as everyone in the market has to live in a housing unit. Hence, if super-
star markets have relatively low population growth, the Bpop term will be 
negative. The population/  housing supply relationship is then adjusted for 
income and price eﬀects. Higher relative income growth in superstars will 
raise the estimate of  L. However, house price growth that is substantially 
higher in superstar markets will lower the value of  L, with the weight deter-
mined by the elasticity of supply.14
11. The interested reader should see Glaeser and Tobio (2008) for more detail on the deriva-
tion of these equations.
12. In the results reported next, we follow Glaeser and Tobio (2008) in presuming that labor’s 
share of input costs ( ) equals 0.6, with that for mobile capital ( ) being 0.3.
13. In the results reported next, we presume that     0.3, which Glaeser and Tobio (2008) 
also used, based on their examination of Consumer Expenditure Survey data over time.
14. We presume that     3 in the following analysis. Supply would be perfectly elastic if     
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To estimate Bpop, Binc, and Bval, for each decade, we regress the decadal log 
change in population, mean income, or mean house price on a dichotomous 
dummy for whether the market ever was a superstar during our sample 
period. Thus, the superstar indicator is constant within each MSA. We also 
allow for a number of controls, including the beginning of period mean 
population, mean income, mean house price, and the share of the adult 
population with a college degree. Those regression coeﬃcients are reported 
in table 2.4. The results typically were not economically or even statistically 
diﬀerent if we omitted the controls.
It is worth noting that our deﬁ  nition of a superstar market as described 
in the preceding section is a function of the prior two decades’ house price 
and housing unit growth. Since our data starts in 1950, our ﬁ  rst decade 
where superstar status is fully predetermined is 1970. However, since we are 
using an indicator for whether an MSA ever was deﬁ  ned as a superstar, we 
feel comfortable backcasting the superstar identiﬁ  cation to 1960. When we 
use a time-  varying deﬁ  nition of superstar status in the next section, we will 
restrict our attention to 1970 and later.
In the 1960s, population growth in markets that ultimately became super-
stars was not materially diﬀerent from those that did not. However, it has 
been appreciably lower in every subsequent decade, with the gap widening 
over time. These estimated coeﬃcients are reported in the ﬁ  rst four col-
umns of the top panel of table 2.4. Superstar MSAs had almost 4 percent-
age points lower population growth (relative to other MSAs) in the 1970s, 
almost 5 percentage points lower in the 1980s, and almost 8 percentage 
points lower in the 1990s. To smooth out some decade-  to-  decade ﬂ  uctua-
tions, the last two columns of table 2.4 pool the 1960s and 1970s decades 
and the 1980s and 1990s decades. Over the 1960 to 1980 period, superstars 
had statistically insigniﬁ  cantly lower population growth. But during 1980 to 
2000, superstars’ population growth averaged almost 5.5 percentage points 
lower than other MSAs.
Superstar markets also experienced higher income and house price growth, 
as can be seen in the middle and bottom panels of table 2.4, respectively. 
However, all of the higher growth came in the 1960s and 1980s. Indeed, dur-
ing the 1970s and 1990s, superstar markets had income and price growth 
below that of other cities (with the exception of house price growth in the 
1970s). However, the more rapid growth for superstars in the 1960s exceeded 
the decline in the 1970s, and the growth in the 1980s exceeded the decline in 
the 1990s. Thus, in the last two columns of table 2.4, which average across 
decade pairs, superstars had income and house price growth that typically 
exceeded that of other MSAs. Over the 1960 to 1980 period, superstars had 
and Tobio (2008) also worked with     3. The value of   does aﬀect the magnitude of the 
housing supply innovations, although no reasonable value changes the relative magnitudes of 
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almost no excess income growth but had almost 5 percentage points higher 
house price growth. Over the 1980 to 2000 period, superstars experienced 
almost 4 percentage points higher income growth and almost 8 percentage 
points higher house price growth.
The decade-  to-  decade volatility in the estimated superstar coeﬃcients is 
not so surprising, given the well-  known mean reversion in house prices. If 
superstars have higher trend income and house price growth but also greater 
volatility around that trend, then excess growth in one decade should be 
followed by less growth the next. This eﬀect is compounded by our observ-
ing house prices and incomes only once per decade. Instead, what table 2.4 
shows is that the long- run trends for superstars in income and house price 
growth are above those of other MSAs, while their long-  run population 
growth is below that of other markets on average.
Next, we apply equations (8) through (10) to convert the estimated co-
eﬃcients in table 2.4 into innovations in productivity, amenities, and hous-
ing supply in table 2.5.15 At the decadal frequency, superstar markets do 
not exhibit consistently higher productivity or amenity growth (the ﬁ  rst two 
panels). The estimates are positive in some decades and negative in others. 
For productivity, only in the 1980s did superstar MSAs seem to experience 
sizeable excess productivity growth. The decadal amenity results are small 
in general, indicating that superstar markets are not very diﬀerent from the 
average along this dimension.
When we look at the twenty- year periods, in the last two columns of table 
2.5, the pattern becomes clearer. Superstars eﬀectively had no excess pro-
ductivity growth during the 1960 to 1980 period, but they did have 2.2 per-
centage points higher productivity growth during the 1980 to 2000 period. 
Table 2.4  Decadal population, income, and house price growth regressions
    1960s   1970s   1980s   1990s   1960–1980   1980–2000
Population growth on superstar market dummy
Bpop 0.0046 –0.0394∗∗ –0.0483∗∗ –0.0771∗∗ –0.0096 –0.0542∗∗
(0.0159) (0.0167) (0.0125) (0.0146) (0.0143) (0.0110)
Income growth on superstar market dummy
Binc 0.0205∗∗ –0.0127 0.1085∗∗ –0.0110 0.0016 0.0384∗∗
(0.0090) (0.0091) (0.0125) (0.0082) (0.0051) (0.0063)
House price growth on superstar market dummy
Bval 0.0773∗∗ 0.0284 0.3510∗∗ –0.0777∗∗ 0.0492∗∗ 0.0794∗∗
    (0.0129)   (0.0247)   (0.0289)   (0.0262)   (0.0132)   (0.0117)
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
15. All regression coeﬃcients and assumptions regarding consumption and sector shares are 
taken at face value in these calculations, which is why no standard errors are reported for these 
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By contrast, superstars’ amenity growth is not much diﬀerent from that of 
other cities and over the 1980 to 2000 period was actually below that of 
nonsuperstar markets.
Superstar markets are most consistently diﬀerent from other areas in 
terms of their housing supply growth, as can be seen in the bottom panel 
of table 2.5. It was much less (9 percentage points) even in the 1960s, before 
these places ﬁ  lled up, according to our measure of “superstarness.” Relative 
housing supply was similarly low in the 1970s, with these markets building 
dramatically less in the 1980s. The results for the 1990s indicate a marked 
change in this pattern, although the estimate is only slightly positive at 2.9 
percentage points. This discrepancy is swamped by the overall trend, as can 
be seen in the last two columns. Over 1960 to 1980, superstars’ supply growth 
was 8.2 percentage points lower than for other cities. That diﬀerence rose to 
13.5 percentage points during 1980 to 2000.
In sum, the only clear pattern is that Superstars have long had much 
less housing production than other markets. There is some evidence that 
productivity growth was higher for superstars in the last two decades, but 
as noted before, the productivity growth results are sometimes positive and 
sometimes negative, with only the 1980s generating the bulk of the higher 
measured productivity growth. Thus, not only are the magnitudes of the 
productivity diﬀerences smaller than the housing supply eﬀects, but there 
is less of a clear pattern indicating that superstar markets are more (or less) 
productive than other markets.
2.4      The Distribution of Income within Metropolitan 
Areas: Superstars versus Nonsuperstars
What enabled us to distinguish productivity and amenity growth in sec-
tion 2.3 was the relationship between the growth of average income and 
average house prices. If house price growth were large relative to income 
growth in a given MSA, one could conclude that amenities were improving 
since the after-  housing income would have declined. If income or popu-
lation growth were high, that indicates greater local productivity leading to 
greater demand for living in the city. In large part, what tables 2.4 and 2.5 
Table 2.5  Growth decomposition: Productivity, amenities, and housing supply
    1960s   1970s   1980s   1990s   1960–1980  1980–2000
Innovations to productivity
  Superstar,  with  controls 0.019 –0.013 0.071 –0.015 0.0002 0.022
Innovations to amenities
  Superstar,  with  controls 0.003 0.021 –0.003 –0.012 0.013 –0.015
Innovations to housing supply
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tell us is that house price growth and income growth must have been highly 
correlated within MSA. Indeed, the distribution of income growth rates 
across MSAs looks very much like that of house price growth, with wide 
dispersion and some right skew. This partly can be seen in ﬁ  gure 2.5, which 
plots the kernel density of average annual real income growth over the 1950 
to 2000 period by MSA. It shows that growth rates range from 0.8 percent 
per year to 3.1 percent.
However, another important stylized fact is that the entire distribution of 
income, not just the average, has been changing diﬀerentially for superstar 
MSAs, even relative to the nation as a whole. Over the last ﬁ  fty years, the 
United States has experienced growth in the absolute number, population 
share, and income share of high- income households (Autor, Katz, and Kear-
ney 2006; Piketty and Saez 2003; Saez 2004). The left panel of ﬁ  gure 2.6 
shows that the aggregate distribution of family income across all MSAs in 
the United States has been shifting to the right in real dollars, as the right tail 
of the income distribution has grown much faster than the mean. The right 
panel of ﬁ  gure 2.6 then displays the evolution of the number of families in 
each of the income bins. Most of the growth in the number of families was 
among those earning more than the $78,358 median value for our sample.
These changes in the national high-  income share were accompanied 
by very disparate patterns at the metropolitan-  area level. Two canonical 
MSAs—San Francisco and Las Vegas—provide a vivid contrast. San 
Francisco experienced low levels of new construction and high house price 
growth (ﬁ  gure 2.7). Between 1950 and 1960, the San Francisco PMSA ex-
panded its population by about 48,000 families. Over the subsequent four 
decades, San Francisco grew by only 44,000 families, with two- thirds of that 
growth taking place between 1960 and 1970. Real house prices spiked in San 
Fig. 2.5    Density of 1950 to 2000 annualized real income growth rates across 
MSAs with 1950 population > 50,000Fig. 2.6    The evolution of the national income distribution
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Francisco after 1970, growing between 3 and 4 percent per year between 
1970 and 1990—about 1.5 percentage points above the average across all 
MSAs—and 1.4 percent per year between 1990 and 2000—almost 1 per-
centage point above the all-  MSA average. By contrast, over the same time 
period, Las Vegas saw explosive population growth, expanding from fewer 
than 50,000 families in 1960 to the size of the San Francisco PMSA by 2000 
(ﬁ  gure 2.8). Yet, it experienced modest real house price growth that was well 
below the national average.
Note that San Francisco’s high-  income share grew disproportionately. 
San Francisco, which always had relatively more rich families and fewer poor 
families than Las Vegas, became even more skewed toward high-  income 
families between 1960 and 2000. Since the number of families in the San 
Francisco MSA did not grow by much, the MSA actually experienced an 
increase in the number of rich families and a reduction in the number of 
lower- income ones. In fact, only the richest groups with incomes of $78,358 
and above increased their share of the number of families in the San Fran-
cisco MSA.
In stark contrast, the overall income distribution in Las Vegas did not 
keep up with the nation (left panel of ﬁ  gure 2.8), leaving that metropoli-
tan area progressively more poor relative to both San Francisco and the 
U.S. metropolitan-  area aggregate. The large numbers of new families in 
Las Vegas were both rich and poor, leading to substantial growth in the 
number of families across the income distribution of Las Vegas. Relative 
Fig. 2.8    Las Vegas (big unit growth) gains rich and poor, shares stay constant86        Joseph Gyourko, Christopher Mayer, and Todd Sinai
to the   national income distribution, however, the growth in Las Vegas was 
skewed toward poorer families.
We can generalize this pattern beyond San Francisco and Las Vegas by 
comparing the evolution of the income distribution in our superstar MSAs 
to other MSAs. Table 2.6 reports regression results on the link between 
income distributions and house prices using our earlier categorization of 
cities into superstar versus nonsuperstar status. We start with the cross-
 sectional relationship and then examine the data over time. The speciﬁ  cation 
in equation (11) investigates whether a typical superstar market’s household 
income is skewed to the right of the U.S. income distribution, as we saw was 
the case for San Francisco. Speciﬁ  cally, we estimate the following regression 
for MSA i in year t:
(11)  
# in Income Binyit   
# of Householdsyit
    1(Superstari)    2(Nonsuperstari)
     3(Superstarit)    4(Nonsuperstarit) 
     1(Low Demandi)    2(Low Demandit) 
     t   εit.
Essentially, this regression relates the share of an MSA’s families that are in 
each income bin to its superstar status and controls for total demand.16
The ﬁ  rst column of the top panel of table 2.6 is based on a pooled cross-
  section of 1,116 MSA   year observations.17 As in table 2.4, this regression 
treats superstar status as a (nonexclusive) ﬁ  xed MSA characteristic, includ-
ing indicator variables for whether the MSA ever was a superstar over the 
1970 to 2000 period, whether it was ever in the nonsuperstar range, whether 
the MSA ever moved inside the low-  demand area, and time dummies. The 
group of intermediate, high-  demand MSAs from region B of ﬁ  gure 2.4 is 
the excluded category in all the regressions reported in table 2.6.
The diﬀerence in income distribution between superstars and all other 
MSAs is pronounced. Those MSAs that ever were superstars have a 2.5 
percentage point greater share of their families that are in the rich category 
relative to the excluded high- demand cities (row [1], column [1]). This eﬀect is 
largest at the high end of the income distribution and declines in magnitude 
as incomes fall. For example, as reported in square brackets in row (1), the 
high-  income share of superstar MSAs is about 83 percent more than the 
3 percent share of families who are rich for the average MSA that is not 
a superstar. The share of the next-  highest income category is 69 percent 
greater in superstars relative to the average of other MSAs and 34 percent 
higher in the middle category. Markets that have ever been superstars also 
16. See the appendix table 2A.2 for summary statistics on all variables used in these regres-
sions.
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Table 2.6  The income distribution in superstar MSAs
Left-  hand-  side variable: Share of MSA families in income bin
    Rich  
Middle 
rich   Middle  
Middle 
poor   Poor
Cross- section:
Superstari 0.025 0.022 0.042 –0.004 –0.086
[relative to mean share] (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007)
[0.833] [0.688] [0.339] [–0.010] [–0.208]
Nonsuperstari 0.005 0.003 0.002 –0.023 0.013
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006)
Low demandi –0.008 –0.007 –0.010 0.007 0.017
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007)
Adjusted R2 0.442 0.621 0.377 0.178 0.214
Time-  varying superstar/nonsuperstar status
Superstari 0.013 0.011 0.035 0.013 –0.071
[relative to mean share] (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.009)
[0.433] [0.344] [0.282] [0.0325] [–0.171]
Nonsuperstari 0.005 0.005 0.002 –0.022 0.010
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007)
Low demandi –0.006 –0.006 –0.009 0.000 0.021
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007)
Superstarit 0.028 0.027 0.017 –0.030 –0.041
[relative to mean share] (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.008) (0.015)
[0.903] [0.818] [0.135] [–0.075] [–0.100]
Nonsuperstarit –0.003 –0.006 –0.004 0.010 0.003
(0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.009)
Low demandit –0.003 –0.003 –0.003 0.015 –0.006
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007)
Adjusted R2 0.504 0.669 0.383 0.207 0.219
Mean of LHS
 Superstari   0 0.030 0.032 0.124 0.400 0.414
 [superstarit   0]   [0.031]   [0.033]   [0.126]   [0.402]   [0.409]
Notes: Number of observations is 1,116, for four decades (1970 to 2000) and 279 MSAs. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. All speciﬁ  cations include year dummies. Superstarit is 
equal to 1 when an MSA’s ratio of real annual price growth over the previous two decades to 
its annual housing unit growth over the same period exceeds 1.7 (the ninetieth percentile) and 
the sum of price and unit growth over that period exceeds the median. Superstari is equal to 1 
for an MSA if superstarit is ever equal to 1. Nonsuperstarit is equal to 1 when the price growth/
unit growth ratio is below 1/1.7, and nonsuperstari is an indicator of whether nonsuperstarit is 
ever 1. To control for MSA demand, the top panel includes an indicator variable for whether 
the MSA’s sum of annual price growth and unit growth over any twenty year period fell below 
the median in that period. The bottom panel includes that variable plus a time-  varying vari-
able for whether the sum of the growth rates over the preceding twenty years was below the 
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have a nearly 9   percentage point lower share of families who are poor (row 
[1], column [5]), almost 21 percent less than the other MSAs.
Nonsuperstar cities appear similar to the in-  between group (row [2]). 
Those coeﬃcients are relatively small and do not exhibit a clear pattern. Low- 
demand MSAs are less high income and poorer relative to all of the high 
demand categories of MSAs, although the magnitudes are modest (row [3]).
The second panel of table 2.6 adds time-  varying superstar, nonsuperstar, 
and low-  demand indicator variables to the previous speciﬁ  cations. Prior 
to becoming superstars, MSAs that eventually will become superstars are 
richer on average, with a 1.3 percentage point greater share of families who 
are rich and a 7.1 percentage point lower share of families who are poor (row 
[1] of panel 2). When these areas are actually in the superstar region, the 
share of families who are rich goes up by an additional 2.8 percentage points, 
and the share of families who are poor declines further by 4.1 percentage 
points (row [4] of panel 2). As a baseline, superstar cities have a 43 percent 
higher share of families who are rich, declining monotonically to a 17 per-
cent lower share of families who are poor, than other MSAs. After their 
transition to superstar status, these MSAs have an additional 80 to 90 per-
cent greater share of the top two income groups and an 8 to 10 percent lower 
share of the bottom two income categories. As before, this pattern of results 
is robust to adding a host of controls for potential unobservables, such as 
MSA ﬁ  xed eﬀects, diﬀerential time trends for superstars versus not, or sepa-
rate year dummies for superstars/  nonsuperstars/  low-  demand MSAs.
2.5    Urban  Productivity  Diﬀerences and the 
Skewing of House Prices and Incomes
We now turn to a discussion of existing theories of urban growth and 
how consistent they are with the set of stylized facts that we have estab-
lished. We ﬁ  rst consider growth in amenities as an explanation and then turn 
to diﬀerences in productivity across MSAs. Finally, we consider dynamic 
agglomeration economies. In the next section, we will discuss a less tradi-
tional story that links national growth in the high- income population to the 
presence of housing supply constraints in some labor market areas to induce 
income- based  sorting.
The standard spatial equilibrium model in urban economics developed by 
Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982) suggests that house price diﬀerences across 
markets are a function of amenity and wage (productivity) diﬀerentials. 
Glaeser and Saiz (2003) and Shapiro (2006) investigate the eﬀect of ame-
nities on the growth of population and employment. Both conclude that 
the link between education and metro- area population/ employment growth 
largely is due to productivity, with amenities playing a smaller role. Going 
beyond the reduced-  form OLS estimation standard in the literature, Sha-
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about 60 percent of the impact of a higher local population share of college 
graduates on metropolitan-  area employment growth is due to productiv-
ity, as reﬂ  ected in wage growth. This does leave room for improvements in 
the quality of life to play a role, too, and they appear related to “consumer 
city”-  type attributes, as reﬂ  ected in various local cultural traits (Glaeser, 
Kolko, and Saiz 2001).
In our context, growth in amenities conceivably could cause the excess 
growth in house prices in superstar markets. However, this seems unlikely, 
since the results of the decomposition in section 2.3 indicate that amenities 
play little—if any—role. This makes intuitive sense: the growth in amenities 
in some MSAs would have to be substantial in order to match the patterns 
of long- run house price growth we observe. In addition, the amenities would 
have to be favored by high- income households in order to generate the cross-
  MSA changes in income distributions.
An alternative explanation for our stylized facts is that urban productivity 
diﬀerentials are growing suﬃciently to account for the increases in house 
price and income dispersion that we observe in the data. Van Nieuwer-
burgh and Weill (2006) investigate the role of productivity by developing a 
dynamic, general equilibrium version of the Rosen- Roback model in which 
they then run calibration exercises to see whether there has been enough 
growth in wage dispersion across labor markets to account for the growth 
in house price dispersion.18 Essentially, they assume homogeneous physi-
cal markets receive unobservable exogenous productivity shocks, and they 
investigate whether their model can then match the increase in the coeﬃcient 
of variation in house prices across markets between two steady states. This 
exercise yields a very good match of the mean annual increase in house prices 
between 1975 and 2004, as well as a tight ﬁ  t of the increase in the coeﬃcient 
of variation in house prices across markets. This simulation also results in a 
good match of the growth of population in the productive places with higher 
wages. Although the framework is dynamic, the essential insight of Rosen 
and Roback still holds—housing costs are the price one has to pay to access 
the productivity of a given labor market area.19
Although the results in Van Nieuwerburgh and Weill (2006) are consistent 
with growing urban productivity diﬀerentials being the cause of the growing 
house price dispersion across labor market areas, they are not conclusive 
in proving causality. In particular, their results are not consistent with the 
empirical fact in our table 2.3 and ﬁ  gure 2.4 that the MSAs that experience 
18. Van Nieuwerburgh and Weill (2006) provide one of the ﬁ  rst truly dynamic frameworks to 
analyze spatial equilibria. Glaeser and Gyourko (2006) also have produced a dynamic model, 
but it is designed to investigate higher frequency movements in house prices.
19. There are a host of other results, ranging from the role of supply-  side constraints to the 
change in the ratio of house prices to construction costs. We do not review those ﬁ  ndings here 
so as to stay focused on the relationship between the skewing of incomes and house prices 
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long-  run house price growth often have little population growth and vice 
versa. A careful review of Van Nieuwerburgh and Weill’s (2006) data indi-
cates that the productive/  high-  wage markets to which the model predicts 
people should move include both high price growth/  low population growth 
cities in the A section of our ﬁ  gure 2.4, as well as high population growth/ low 
price growth cities in the C section. More generally, there is a mixture of 
both types of markets in Van Nieuwerburgh and Weill’s (2006) predicted 
top-  wage quintile. Thus, it appears that their model’s ability to match the 
data is at least partially the result of it picking up much of the growing price 
dispersion from very high-  price (and price appreciation) coastal markets 
that have very little homebuilding and population growth; analogously, it 
looks to be picking up much of the housing unit/  population growth from 
large Sunbelt markets that have relatively low house price levels and that 
have experienced relatively little price appreciation. This suggests that it 
remains an open question whether the growing dispersion in house prices 
and matching dispersion in income growth are being driven exclusively by 
random productivity shocks.
Much has been written in urban economics and in the broader growth lit-
erature about agglomeration eﬀects and the potential for increasing returns 
in some markets that conceivably could causally link the endogenous rela-
tionship between house price and income growth previously documented. 
Indeed, Lucas (1988) explicitly notes that cities are a natural laboratory 
in which to test growth models involving some type of productivity spill-
over. Glaeser et al. (1992), Glaeser, Scheinkman, and Shleifer (1995), and 
Henderson, Kuncoro, and Turner (1995) soon followed with analyses of 
dynamic agglomeration economies that extend across time. While there is 
much debate about the precise nature of the spillovers involved, there is 
widespread agreement that there are long-  run eﬀects from urban agglom-
erations.20
Much of the more recent agglomeration research starts with the basic fact 
that skilled cities grow more quickly, where growth is measured in terms of 
quantities such as population or employment. For example, Glaeser and 
Saiz (2003) document that at the metropolitan-  area level, a 1 percentage 
point higher population share for college graduates is associated with about 
a 0.5 percentage point higher decadal population growth rate. Similarly, 
Shapiro (2006) shows that from 1940 through 1990, a 10 percent higher 
concentration of college graduates is associated with a 0.8 increase in future 
employment growth (also at the metropolitan-  area level).
Since Rauch (1993), we have known wages in a market rise with the skill 
level of that market, holding constant individual worker skills. Moretti 
(2004) recently conﬁ  rmed Rauch’s basic correlation, identifying human 
20. See Rosenthal and Strange (2003) for an extensive review of the urban agglomeration 
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capital externalities via an instrumental variables estimation that uses the 
presence of land grant universities as an instrument that proxies for human 
capital in the area but is plausibly exogenous to wages.21
Urban wage premia do appear to be relatively large. Glaeser and Mare 
(2001) estimate them to be on the order of 20 to 35 percent for workers in 
larger cities. Those authors also ﬁ  nd that long- term residents in bigger cities 
earn a premium over new arrivals and that when long-  term workers leave 
their city for another, the larger the size of their previous market, the higher 
their wages are in the new location.22
While there is much evidence consistent with the presence of dynamic 
spillovers, the agglomeration literature has not focused on the relationship 
between house price and income dispersion. However, it is not hard to see 
a natural link. If productivity diﬀerences across markets are growing, then 
the higher wages that result in the most productive agglomerations should 
be capitalized into land values (and thus house price) in markets where the 
supply of housing is constrained.
This story requires a very high rate of value growth, consistency in the 
location of agglomeration beneﬁ  ts in areas with inelastic supply sides to 
their housing markets, and ﬁ  rms that will not move to cheaper places. It 
certainly is not hard to understand how diﬃcult it would be to recreate 
somewhere else the production or consumption externalities that lead to 
increasing returns. In the short run, this probably is impossible, although 
it seems more open to debate whether we should expect mobility of people 
and ﬁ  rms to be high over half-  century-  long periods. In addition, it is not 
immediately clear why such productivity would tend to occur in supply-
 constrained  markets.
2.6      Household Sorting and Supply Constraints as Explanations 
for the Spatial Skewing of House Prices and Incomes
While a positive relationship between house prices and incomes across 
MSAs suggests that there might be innate diﬀerences in productivity across 
locations, it may be that productive people agglomerate rather than agglom-
erations make people more productive (Glaeser and Mare 2001). In addi-
tion, people may value grouping together for various reasons that do not 
have anything to do with production (Waldfogel 2003).
Given that, an alternative explanation for the stylized facts described ear-
lier can be found in Gyourko, Mayer, and Sinai (2006). In that paper, the 
21. That said, there is some debate about the strength of such externalities, with Acemoglu 
and Angrist (2000) ﬁ  nding small eﬀects but at the state level. See Moretti (2003) for a recent 
review of the literature on human capital externalities in cities.
22. There is research on the ﬁ  rm side, too. For example, Henderson (1997) shows that con-
centrations of own-  industry employment have measureable impacts on growth many years 
into the future.92        Joseph Gyourko, Christopher Mayer, and Todd Sinai
growth in incomes and house prices across MSAs is due to inelastic supply 
in certain MSAs, heterogeneity in preferences for living in various MSAs 
across households, and a growing absolute number of high-  income house-
holds at the national level. Importantly, neither the elasticity of supply nor 
the distribution of tastes for MSAs need vary over time for the Gyourko, 
Mayer, and Sinai (2006) hypothesis. Instead, changes in the income distri-
bution at the national level percolate down to diﬀerences in the composition 
of families at the MSA level.
In addition, the comparative statics do not depend on the reasons for 
location preferences or the inelasticity of supply in the one market. All that 
is required is that some households prefer one city over the others and that 
there be some binding limit (natural or regulatory) on the supply of new 
housing units in some MSAs. Ultimately, the relatively rich with a prefer-
ence for the market with an inelastic housing supply outbid the poor for the 
scarce slots. Gyourko, Mayer, and Sinai (2006) conclude that it is increases 
in the number of rich people nationally that should be correlated with the 
spatial skewing of prices and incomes. The intuition is that skewing can 
continue and increase as long as the growth in the number of rich people, at 
least some of whom have a preference for the supply-  constrained market, 
exceeds the growth in supply in that market. The urban productivity model 
does not predict any such relationship with national aggregates.
That the right tail of the national income distribution has indeed been 
getting thicker over time is conﬁ  rmed in ﬁ  gure 2.9, which reports data from 
Saez (2004) on the share of U.S. income by population percentile over time. 
The tax- return data Saez (2004) uses provides a very clear picture of changes 
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at the high end of the income distribution. The share of income held by 
the very top percentiles of the U.S. population—the top one-  hundredth or 
0.01 percentile, the 0.1 to 0.01 percentile, and the 0.5 to 0.1 percentile—all 
increased dramatically over the last forty years. The income share of the 
top 1 percent grew from under 10 percent in 1960 to almost 17 percent in 
2000. Even the share of income held by the ﬁ  rst to tenth percentiles of the 
population went up, from about 23 percent in 1960 to about 27 percent in 
2000. While the income data reported in the decennial censuses in ﬁ  gure 
2.6 are not nearly as ﬁ  ne or detailed as that available to Saez (2004), this 
source also shows skewing over time similar to that observed in the Internal 
Revenue Service data.
Gyourko, Mayer and Sinai (2006) show that changes in the national in-
come distribution are correlated with more rapid house price growth in 
superstar markets. They regress a proxy for the entry price of a home (they 
use the tenth percentile house value in each metropolitan area) on a set of 
indicators for superstar/  nonsuperstar/  low growth status that are also inter-
acted with the national number of rich families. Their ﬁ  ndings imply that 
when the national number of rich families is 10 percent higher, the gap in 
the tenth percentile house value between MSAs that are ever superstars and 
those in-  between markets is 1.1 percent greater.23
2.7    Conclusion
The growing dispersion in house price and income growth rates across 
MSAs is one of the most important stylized facts about metropolitan areas 
in America. The spatial sorting by income that it necessarily involves goes 
to the heart of how we live and organize ourselves socially. Whether these 
phenomena are due primarily to increasing value from amenities and pro-
ductivity beneﬁ  ts or are the result of a growing number of high-  income 
families willing to pay increasingly large amounts to live in a few supply-
 constrained markets is likely to have much to say about how many of us view 
this ongoing development.
This chapter has documented the basic facts about the spatial distribu-
tion of house prices and incomes and has outlined several possible expla-
nations for the patterns we see in the data. Our review concludes that it is 
unlikely that growth in urban amenities, urban productivity, or agglomera-
tion beneﬁ  ts are the sole causal forces involved. Rather, the skewing of the 
income distribution nationally is interacting with binding supply-  side con-
straints in certain (primarily coastal) markets to help generate the variation 
23. Gyourko, Mayer, and Sinai (2006) report results from several other empirical tests that 
are designed to distinguish between growth in the value of a location (such as from productiv-
ity growth) and growth and willingness to pay for the same utility (such as a greater number 
of high-  income households that must choose between MSAs). We refer the interested reader 
to that paper for details.94        Joseph Gyourko, Christopher Mayer, and Todd Sinai
observed. However, the empirical importance of the diﬀerent explanations 
remains unresolved. Parsing this out is an essential task for future research 
that will not be easy but that is important for our understanding of urban 
 markets.24
More generally, these changes in the nature of metropolitan America have 
profound implications for the evolution of urban areas. If the skewing and 
dispersion continues to grow, even large metropolitan areas could evolve into 
markets that are aﬀordable only to the rich. In eﬀect, an entire labor market 
area could have the income distribution of an exclusive resort. We do not 
know whether such an MSA is sustainable. Moreover, should public policy 
ensure that living in a particular city is available to all, or, because superstar 
cities are like luxury goods, should we not care whether lower- income house-
holds can buy into those markets any more than we care whether they can 
buy a Mercedes? The answer also has important implications for views on 
policy issues such as tax-  based subsidies to homeownership. While econo-
mists can justify subsidies based on positive externalities involving better 
citizenship or improved outcomes for children (DiPasquale and Glaeser 
1999; Green and White 1997), the case becomes harder if one believes that 
the high prices in America’s coastal markets are due more to preference-
 based sorting combined with binding local regulation on homebuilding than 
to productivity. These and other questions will provide fertile ground for 
thought and research by economists interested in urban agglomerations.
24. Even if preference-  based sorting explains the moves of the rich into markets like San 
Francisco, it is possible that once the rich agglomerate in that market, productivity then 
increases. Hence, the two forces may interact in various ways.Appendix





1950 Mean value 
(2000 dollars)  
2000 Mean value 
(2000 dollars)
Abilene, TX 34.6 54,917 73,918
Akron, OH 93.9 69,720 135,174
Albany, GA 61.7 60,388 97,630
Albany, NY 62.3 75,522 122,604
Albuquerque, NM 132.6 64,411 149,835
Alexandria, LA 98.9 46,114 91,722
Allentown, PA 110.3 61,811 129,981
Altoona, PA 99.2 43,163 85,966
Amarillo, TX 54.4 61,713 95,299
Ann Arbor, MI 177.2 70,125 194,421
Anniston, AL 132.5 37,222 86,527
Appleton, WI 93.3 63,152 122,098
Asheville, NC 192.3 50,005 146,159
Athens, GA 191.4 49,138 143,184
Atlanta, GA 178.8 61,933 172,667
Atlantic City, NC 128.3 68,581 156,590
Auburn- Opelika,  AL 151.5 50,779 127,708
Augusta, GA 138.9 45,543 108,814
Austin, TX 193.8 55,895 164,223
Bakersﬁ  eld, CA 94.7 57,461 111,850
Baltimore, MD 148.6 65,817 163,594
Bangor, ME 113.3 43,328 92,403
Barnstable, MA 205.5 76,239 232,912
Baton Rouge, LA 115.3 56,276 121,178
Beaumont, TX 47.6 51,200 75,580
Bellingham, WA 276.4 49,780 187,380
Benton Harbor, MI 103.9 59,222 120,727
Bergen- Passic,  NJ 196.0 98,065 290,265
Billings, MT 48.4 79,117 117,401
Biloxi, MS 170.4 39,205 106,029
Binghamton, NY 24.4 70,626 87,873
Birmingham, AL 178.1 47,949 133,362
Bismarck, ND 72.0 61,250 105,354
Bloomington, IN 112.1 61,691 130,870
Bloomington, IL 176.3 47,973 132,556
Boise City, ID 142.6 58,231 141,275
Boston, MA 212.4 76,168 237,974
Boulder, CO 377.2 61,206 292,063
Brazoria, TX 123.5 46,086 103,025
Bremerton, WA 280.4 51,233 194,886
Brownsville, TX 73.8 39,569 68,775
Bryan, TX 137.9 48,788 116,046
Buﬀalo, NY 31.1 79,254 103,880
Burlington, VT 131.9 65,502 151,915
(continued)Canton, OH 78.4 65,215 116,324
Casper, WY 37.8 72,285 99,579
Cedar Rapids, IA 76.4 69,121 121,942
Champaign, IL 49.6 75,056 112,277
Charleston, SC 236.8 47,790 160,960
Charleston, WV 56.0 67,951 105,994
Charlotte, NC 194.1 53,454 157,233
Charlottesville, VA 158.7 66,377 171,734
Chattanooga, TN 154.3 45,327 115,264
Cheyenne, WY 75.5 68,901 120,934
Chicago, IL 113.7 97,920 209,302
Chico, CA 173.8 53,621 146,827
Cincinnati, OH 76.2 82,734 145,774
Clarksville, TN 146.1 39,349 96,846
Cleveland, OH 57.0 91,687 143,988
Colorado Springs, CO 162.7 67,264 176,709
Columbia, MO 106.2 64,039 132,067
Columbia, SC 109.0 62,560 130,741
Columbus, GA 97.8 52,647 104,113
Columbus, GA 112.5 68,152 144,797
Corpus Christi, TX 60.8 52,261 84,055
Corvallis, OR 190.3 65,383 189,834
Cumberland, MD 78.8 45,269 80,950
Dallas, TX 138.4 60,875 145,125
Danville, VA 79.1 49,789 89,160
Davenport, IA 46.4 69,396 101,616
Dayton, OH 63.9 72,429 118,740
Daytona Beach, FL 100.2 56,285 112,670
Decatur, AL 39.7 59,324 82,878
Decatur, IL 162.9 39,426 103,651
Denver, CO 184.3 75,357 214,261
Des Moines, IA 104.8 59,610 122,069
Detroit, MI 123.8 72,666 162,595
Dothan, AL 132.9 41,834 97,447
Dover, DE 142.0 52,372 126,746
Dubuque, IA 55.7 71,399 111,178
Duluth, MN 77.0 50,214 88,899
Dutchess County, NY 103.9 84,876 173,021
Eau Claire, WI 106.0 53,068 109,346
El Paso, TX 21.9 68,651 83,652
Elkhart, IN 124.8 51,894 116,662
Elmira, NY 19.8 65,681 78,693
Enid, OK 35.4 52,425 70,985
Erie, PA 60.8 63,623 102,287
Eugene, OR 169.8 60,521 163,308
Evansville, IN 104.6 51,168 104,673
Fargo, SD 65.2 64,995 107,401





1950 Mean value 
(2000 dollars)  
2000 Mean value 
(2000 dollars)Fayetteville, NC 163.0 44,821 117,882
Fayetteville, AR 131.1 46,057 106,439
Flagstaﬀ, AZ 226.7 50,500 164,989
Flint, MI 108.4 52,717 109,844
Florence, AL 105.7 53,411 109,874
Florence, SC 143.6 41,008 99,881
Fort Collins, CO 246.9 58,103 201,557
Fort Lauderdale, FL 112.5 76,577 162,733
Fort Myers, FL 224.3 47,951 155,498
Fort Pierce, FL 164.5 55,601 147,065
Fort Smith, AR 123.3 38,849 86,732
Fort Walton Beach, FL 310.2 32,220 132,178
Fort Wayne, IN 81.9 58,417 106,245
Fort Worth, TX 125.2 51,794 116,627
Fresno, CA 110.9 61,792 130,339
Gadsden, AL 95.6 43,564 85,218
Gainesville, FL 131.6 52,261 121,013
Galveston, TX 73.9 62,502 108,689
Gary, IN 79.6 68,478 123,004
Glens Falls, NY 111.5 52,596 111,252
Goldsboro, NC 117.0 48,770 105,809
Grand Forks, ND 84.0 52,702 96,954
Grand Junction, CO 182.4 50,121 141,565
Grand Rapids, MI 122.4 61,120 135,937
Great Falls, MT 60.5 66,267 106,331
Greeley, CO 240.5 47,601 162,079
Green Bay, WI 92.0 69,589 133,603
Greensboro- Winston- Salem,  NC 160.4 51,382 133,785
Greenville, NC 126.8 53,496 121,353
Greenville, SC 136.4 51,358 121,431
Hagerstown, MD 128.9 56,392 129,058
Hamilton, OH 101.9 67,859 136,985
Harrisburg, PA 104.5 60,176 123,036
Hartford, CT 85.9 94,780 176,237
Hattiesburg, MS 157.9 37,870 97,658
Hickory, NC 169.4 43,043 115,939
Houma, LA 161.1 36,392 95,011
Houston, TX 100.2 63,203 126,516
Huntington, WV 60.5 52,196 83,751
Huntsville, AL 204.2 41,005 124,754
Indianapolis, IN 123.2 60,474 134,977
Iowa City, IA 101.6 77,367 155,995
Jackson, MI 112.1 47,567 100,887
Jackson, MS 123.8 51,349 114,931
Jackson, TN 77.8 61,374 109,126
Jacksonville, FL 134.7 56,494 132,578
(continued)





1950 Mean value 
(2000 dollars)  
2000 Mean value 
(2000 dollars)Jacksonville, NC 226.7 31,850 104,044
Jamestown, NY 31.3 58,609 76,940
Janesville, WI 76.8 62,627 110,704
Jersey City, NJ 136.8 72,622 171,946
Johnson City, TN 121.3 46,771 103,517
Johnstown, PA 65.9 45,873 76,127
Jonesboro, AR 128.9 43,218 98,938
Joplin, MO 143.5 34,162 83,176
Kalamazoo, MI 97.9 58,856 116,504
Kankakee, IL 70.3 68,181 116,145
Kansas City, MO 118.4 58,259 127,225
Kenosha, WI 93.3 71,148 137,515
Killeen, TX 100.3 44,527 89,207
Knoxville, TN 179.7 44,710 125,053
Kokomo, IN 129.7 45,759 105,114
La Crosse, WI 99.0 56,323 112,078
Lafayette, LA 155.4 39,681 101,363
Lafayette, IN 108.3 59,286 123,521
Lake Charles, LA 95.2 50,583 98,730
Lakeland, FL 101.7 49,523 99,883
Lancaster, PA 100.4 67,637 135,567
Lansing, MI 118.0 56,559 123,283
Laredo, TX 181.2 30,869 86,801
Las Cruces, NM 157.1 43,025 110,607
Las Vegas, NV 147.5 65,114 161,166
Lawrence, KS 187.3 49,050 140,902
Lawton, OK 72.7 48,036 82,946
Lewiston, ME 92.2 52,248 100,434
Lexington- Fayette,  KY 113.7 60,367 129,025
Lima, OH 72.7 56,382 97,381
Lincoln, NE 105.5 61,336 126,018
Little Rock, AR 117.1 50,879 110,443
Longview, TX 123.2 37,678 84,102
Los Angeles, CA 236.6 85,150 286,633
Louisville, KY 113.4 60,413 128,893
Lubbock, TX 36.1 62,442 84,999
Lynchburg, VA 124.4 52,348 117,452
Macon, GA 133.0 44,416 103,502
Madison, WI 99.0 86,136 171,383
Mansﬁ  eld, OH 49.3 64,370 96,099
McAllen, TX 99.9 33,393 66,759
Medford, OR 199.0 56,647 169,383
Melbourne, FL 114.9 55,488 119,262
Memphis, TN 100.7 61,886 124,183
Merced, CA 121.8 58,295 129,318
Miami, FL 95.2 83,286 162,594
Middlesex- Somerset- Hunterdon,  NJ 185.6 80,437 229,739





1950 Mean value 
(2000 dollars)  
2000 Mean value 
(2000 dollars)Milwaukee, WI 69.3 92,698 156,918
Minneapolis-  St. Paul, MN 117.6 77,421 168,496
Missoula, MT 162.5 59,653 156,573
Mobile, AL 184.0 41,465 117,766
Modesto, CA 162.2 55,669 145,969
Monmouth- Ocean,  NJ 160.2 77,938 202,758
Monroe, LA 101.7 49,470 99,781
Montgomery, AL 107.2 55,648 115,307
Muncie, IN 66.8 51,851 86,505
Myrtle Beach, SC 176.3 52,277 144,456
Naples, FL 406.7 51,144 259,155
Nashville- Davidson,  TN 178.8 56,363 157,166
Nassau- Suﬀolk County, NY 167.6 99,692 266,806
New Haven, CT 185.4 103,118 294,297
New London, CT 132.5 74,479 173,185
New Orleans, LA 81.2 71,836 130,140
New York, NY 181.4 103,209 290,412
Newark, NJ 155.2 101,549 259,115
Newburgh, NY 125.2 70,748 159,289
Norfolk, VA 150.2 54,670 136,783
Oakland, CA 300.8 86,596 347,050
Ocala, FL 146.8 40,186 99,169
Odessa, TX 27.4 59,116 75,294
Oklahoma City, OK 65.8 58,078 96,278
Olympia, WA 194.8 57,586 169,788
Omaha, NE 104.3 59,470 121,483
Orange County, CA 356.1 72,185 329,206
Orlando, FL 122.8 61,908 137,919
Owensboro, KY 72.7 55,968 96,648
Panama City, FL 238.7 34,908 118,233
Parkersburg, WV 64.7 56,158 92,516
Pensacola, FL 185.6 40,422 115,431
Peoria- Pekin,  IL 59.8 66,167 105,723
Philadelphia, PA 121.6 66,426 147,186
Phoenix, AZ 209.2 53,106 164,191
Pine Bluﬀ, AR 113.6 33,106 70,724
Pittsburgh, PA 66.1 64,015 106,345
Pittsﬁ  eld, MA 96.9 73,066 143,854
Pocatello, ID 71.7 60,819 104,417
Portland, OR 221.4 63,337 203,578
Portland, ME 169.3 60,377 162,576
Providence, RI 94.1 81,189 157,574
Provo- Orem,  UT 207.3 61,174 187,982
Pueblo, CO 120.8 50,635 111,798
Punta Gorda, FL 215.2 39,342 124,010
Racine, WI 72.1 74,706 128,537
(continued)





1950 Mean value 
(2000 dollars)  
2000 Mean value 
(2000 dollars)Raleigh- Durham- Chapel  Hill,  NC 205.7 58,153 177,794
Rapid City, SD 89.5 59,458 112,668
Reading, PA 96.3 59,750 117,313
Redding, CA 168.0 52,416 140,465
Reno, NV 115.4 96,874 208,650
Richland, WA 117.2 60,700 131,811
Richmond- Petersburgh,  VA 116.5 64,964 140,677
Riverside-  San Bernardino, CA 173.7 59,725 163,483
Roanoke, VA 103.8 60,679 123,680
Rochester, MN 68.1 81,995 137,822
Rochester, NY 56.1 72,348 112,926
Rockford, IL 51.2 73,216 110,727
Rocky Mount, NC 109.4 50,538 105,837
Sacramento, CA 167.9 71,504 191,567
Saginaw, MI 90.4 54,865 104,471
Salem, OR 159.8 59,484 154,551
Salinas, CA 316.6 83,456 347,705
Salt Lake City, UT 157.1 70,810 182,029
San Angelo, TX 52.8 50,539 77,215
San Antonio, TX 75.2 56,397 98,829
San Diego, CA 262.4 78,640 284,952
San Francisco, CA 465.9 96,703 547,206
San Jose, CA 513.3 86,667 531,562
San Luis Obispo, CA 346.0 59,995 267,605
Santa Barbara-  Santa Maria, CA 328.4 89,559 383,707
Santa Cruz, CA 522.0 68,494 426,041
Santa Fe, NM 284.9 66,127 254,503
Santa Rosa, CA 362.5 69,007 319,124
Sarasota, FL 166.7 62,131 165,729
Savannah, GA 153.5 53,867 136,552
Scranton, PA 111.5 49,142 103,948
Seattle, WA 285.7 70,684 272,603
Sharon, PA 58.4 56,123 88,901
Sheboygan, WI 84.6 67,042 123,742
Shermon- Denison,  TX 119.4 38,321 84,065
Shreveport- Bossier,  LA 61.6 57,812 93,411
Sioux City, IA 55.1 57,815 89,660
Sioux Falls, SD 87.5 64,197 120,400
South Bend, IN 66.4 62,322 103,678
Spokane, WA 119.0 60,147 131,739
Springﬁ  eld, IL 83.1 60,736 111,198
Springﬁ  eld, MA 93.7 72,294 140,063
Springﬁ  eld, MO 128.5 47,932 109,543
St. Cloud, MN 135.0 48,134 113,132
St. Joseph, MO 126.5 39,063 88,484
St. Louis, MO 78.6 72,973 130,348





1950 Mean value 
(2000 dollars)  
2000 Mean value 





1950 Mean value 
(2000 dollars)  
2000 Mean value 
(2000 dollars)
State College, PA 145.6 54,367 133,541
Steubenville- Weirton,  OH 34.4 57,706 77,550
Stockton, CA 171.8 60,531 164,517
Sumter, SC 93.4 47,929 92,696
Syracuse, NY 39.8 69,624 97,341
Tacoma, WA 201.6 58,269 175,746
Tallahassee, FL 137.0 53,971 127,889
Tampa-  St. Petersburgh, FL 109.4 58,714 122,967
Terre Haute, IN 134.0 36,094 84,467
Texarkana, TX 123.4 35,200 78,620
Toledo, OH 80.4 65,783 118,705
Topeka, KS 72.1 54,593 93,969
Trenton, NJ 189.2 67,916 196,431
Tucson, AZ 130.5 63,094 145,417
Tulsa, OK 99.0 53,533 106,510
Tuscaloosa, AL 178.6 46,197 128,691
Tyler, TX 97.4 52,262 103,168
Utica- Rome,  NY 30.6 64,791 84,587
Vallejo, CA 233.4 69,620 232,145
Ventura, CA 319.6 70,971 297,826
Victoria, TX 57.2 55,147 86,680
Vineland- Millville- Bridgeton,  NJ 91.2 53,459 102,201
Visalia- Tulare- Porterville,  CA 159.7 46,174 119,908
Waco, TX 70.1 48,552 82,577
Washington, DC 112.7 106,235 225,914
Waterloo-  Cedar Falls, IA 40.2 64,682 90,685
Wausau, WI 114.3 51,753 110,908
West Palm Beach-  Boca Raton, FL 159.7 73,275 190,261
Wheeling, WV 46.3 53,928 78,871
Wichita, KS 62.9 60,499 98,554
Wichita Falls, TX 57.4 47,826 75,266
Williamsport, PA 82.3 53,625 97,759
Wilmington, DE 90.8 82,087 156,661
Wilmington, NC 310.6 42,865 176,011
Yakima, WA 140.7 54,809 131,944
Yolo, CA 205.7 65,842 201,293
York, PA 104.8 60,915 124,730
Youngstown- Warren,  OH 49.8 63,044 94,470
Yuba, CA 146.4 51,463 126,793
Yuma, AZ   156.6   44,473   114,101
Note: Decadal Census; all values in 2000 dollars.102        Joseph Gyourko, Christopher Mayer, and Todd Sinai
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